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Executive 
summary 
 
 
Public patients are routinely being treated in Australian private hospitals. Some 
jurisdictions have large-scale, planned programs where private or not-for-profit 
hospitals are contracted by the public sector to treat public inpatients (for example, 
Queensland’s Surgery Connect program). Often, however, ‘contracting’ is done on 
an ad hoc or short-term basis where private hospitals are asked, at relatively short 
notice, to treat public patients in order to relieve pressure on public hospitals. 
 
The findings from this project stem from interviews with 24 senior health executives 
across Australia. Interviewees were public and private hospital executives and 
government bureaucrats. All had experience in hospital contracting. The focus of the 
interviews was their experiences with contracting: why and how contracting 
arrangements were developed, what worked, what didn’t, and what changes to 
policy and practice were made over time. Interviewees were also asked about their 
views on the merits of contracting, whether it should be done more often, and if so, 
what needed to be done to make sure it worked well.  
 
While the views of these senior health executives on this topic were diverse, several 
clear messages emerged that are pertinent to policymakers working in this area. 
They are: 
 
 The way we are doing contracting currently in Australia tends to be ad hoc, 
and this is enormously frustrating to hospital executives in both the public 
and private sectors. Without greater certainty about the type and volume of 
patients to be treated, and how long contract arrangements will remain in 
place, it is unlikely that the full benefits of contracting (such as more timely 
access to care for public patients, and the more efficient use of resources) 
will be realised. 
 
 Some private hospital executives are unconvinced of the merits of 
contracting because they believe it reduces the value of private health 
insurance and the incentives to develop other private sources of revenue. 
Their views on contracting raise broader policy questions about the relative 
roles of public and private hospitals in Australia. These questions need to be 
addressed if governments intend to expand to use of contracting in the 
hospital sector. 
 
 State and territory governments (referred to as states) need to develop 
clear and consistent policies on contracting in the hospital sector. This 
includes developing fee schedules for different types of services and 
processes for establishing and negotiating contracts with the private sector. 
At the same time state-level policies need to be flexible enough to allow 
local (or regional) health services to make decisions about when, where and 
how contracting is done in their area. Without significant local level 
involvement in decision-making, it is difficult to ensure that contracting 
arrangements between local public and private hospitals (which tend to be 
more convenient for patients) will work in the longer-term.    
 
Hospital executives have suggested numerous options for reform that have the 
potential to improve the way we do contracting in Australia. They range from small- 
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scale reforms, such as contracting over longer time-periods and setting up brokers 
to facilitate contracting, to larger-scale ones such as establishing contestable 
funding pools; co-location of public and private hospitals; public-private 
partnerships; and implementing new hospital financing models (such as Medicare 
Select). These options, and more, need to be given serious consideration by 
policymakers if they are to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of our hospital 
systems. 
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Contracting in Australian hospitals 
 
Introduction 
 
Public patients are being routinely treated in Australian private hospitals under short-term 
contracting arrangements. Contracting can be beneficial for public patients if it means they 
get treated sooner than they would have if they waited for treatment in public hospitals. It 
can also assist public hospitals address unanticipated surges in demand or reduction in 
capacity (for example if there is a particularly bad flu season, or if specialist surgeons in a 
particular area are unavailable for a period of time). There may also be savings for public 
hospitals if the price paid to private hospitals for contracted care is less than the cost of 
treating these patients in public hospitals. 
 
Short-term contracting – at least as it currently operates in many parts of Australia – does 
have some downsides. It can, for example, cost governments more to treat public patients 
in the private sector if they pay a premium for such care (as they sometimes do). 
Contracting can also expose governments to criticism that they are channelling funding to 
private hospitals at the expense of public hospitals, which could do the work if they were 
given additional funding. 
 
There is also a risk that public patients treated under contract in the private sector will 
receive fragmented care because clinicians in the two sectors may not be accustomed to 
working together and do not have easy means of sharing vital information about patient 
care. Contracting can also have a downside for private hospitals if patients and staff see it as 
undermining the value of private health insurance, or as a barrier to developing revenue 
from other private sources. 
 
In this issue brief we do not take a position on the merits of contracting between public and 
private hospitals. The time for these debates is already over because short-term contracting 
between public and private hospitals is happening regularly in many states and territories. 
The purpose of this issue brief is to draw on the knowledge of senior health executives who 
have experience with short-term contracting and highlight some of the ways in which 
contracting arrangements could be changed so that they deliver better outcomes for 
patients, providers and the health system. 
 
The context and influences 
 
Why has short-term contracting in Australian hospitals emerged as an important issue? In 
the following sections the factors that have influenced its emergence are examined. 
 
Australia’s hybrid health system 
 
Australia’s health system has always been marked by its complicated mix of public and 
private funding and service delivery. Roughly two thirds of funding comes from 
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governments and a third from non-government sources, including individuals, private health 
insurance funds and injury compensation schemes. About two thirds of health services are 
delivered by the private sector – ranging from multinational hospital groups, through to 
general practitioners in sole practice. 
 
This complexity is seen in the financial flows between the sectors. The Commonwealth 
Government subsidises private health insurance by providing rebates and, through 
Medicare, pays part of medical fees in private hospitals. Private health insurers pay for 
patients who elect to go ‘private’ in public hospitals.  
 
For most of the twentieth century, private hospitals were either small, often clinician-owned 
operations or more comprehensive organisations run by Catholic and other religious bodies. 
Since the 1980s the scale and scope of private services has been transformed by the 
emergence of large for-profit hospital groups, starting with Mayne Health and more recently 
dominated by the publicly listed Ramsay Group and Healthscope. At the same time, private 
day clinics have transformed surgical practice. 
 
The Productivity Commission has offered a simple definition of each sector – based on 
ownership.1 A public hospital is: 
 
‘a health care provider facility that has been established under state or territory legislation as a 
hospital or as a freestanding day procedure unit. Public hospitals are operated by, or on behalf of, the 
government of the state or territory in which they are established. Public hospitals provide hospital 
services free of charge to all eligible patients’. 
 
A private hospital is ‘privately owned and managed, charges for services rendered, and 
offers patients choice of doctor’.2 
 
There are some clear differences between the sectors. Importantly, patients in private 
hospitals have a shorter average length of stay per separation than patients in public 
hospitals. This appears to be because surgical procedures in private hospitals have shorter 
associated patient stays than other groups of patients. This reflects the different casemix; 
private hospitals undertake relatively more surgical procedures than public hospitals.3 As 
some specialist services, such as ophthalmology and oncology, have largely moved to the 
private sector, people without private health insurance have been left in longer waiting lists 
in the public sector. 
 
As a result, the lines between public and private hospital services are blurred. A 2009 
Productivity Commission review identified this confusion. It reported that the two sectors 
were ‘complementary’ providing distinct services that supplemented one another. However, 
it also noted that the two sectors share many similar functions, compete for staff, and offer 
                                                          
1
 Productivity Commission (2009), Public and Private Hospitals, Canberra. 
2
 Ibid 
3
 Ibid 
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many services that are ‘substitutable’. While they have a ‘markedly different casemix’, their 
boundaries are blurred and they are effectively ‘interdependent’.4 
 
This confusion has been exacerbated by the failure of successive reforms of the health 
system to deal with the question of intersectoral relations. The 1991 National Health 
Strategy, launched at the beginning of the expansion of for-profit hospital groups, 
complained that the two sectors ‘remain separate entities’ and ‘tend to be planned and 
financed in isolation’, suggesting that this must lead to inefficiencies. The consequences – 
and remedies – were left unclear. 
 
Past health reforms have avoided dealing directly with this mixed economy of hospital 
provision.5 The Howard government focused on boosting the viability of private hospitals by 
encouraging private health insurance. The 1999 Productivity Commission study of private 
hospitals lamented the narrowness of its terms of reference, which blocked any 
consideration of the whole system. Despite these restrictions, it suggested a few 
(unheeded) changes to increase efficiency, such as opening up opportunities for private 
hospitals to do contracting work to relieve pressure on the public system.6 
 
The Rudd and Gillard governments concentrated on the funding and governance structures 
of the public sector. Calls from the National Health and Hospital Reform Commission to 
build reform around better integration of a strong mixed public-private system fell on deaf 
ears.7 
 
Consequently, formal relations and cooperation between public and private hospitals owe 
little to broader reforms of hospital funding and service delivery. 
 
At a national level, the Department of Veterans Affairs contracts for services from private 
hospitals. This scheme was set up to replace the government-owned veteran's hospitals 
(which were transferred to the states), but does not involve hospital-to-hospital contracting. 
 
There are no other Australian examples of national arrangements, such as the UK 
Independent Sector Treatment Centres. These privately run units provide surgical services, 
under contract, to NHS patients.8 Ramsay Health Care (UK) currently owns nine of these 
treatment centres. 
 
                                                          
4
 Ibid 
5
 Boxall, A, Reforming Australia’s health system, again, Medical Journal of Australia, 2010; 192 (9): 528-530. 
6
 Productivity Commission (1999). Private Hospitals in Australia. Canberra. 
7
 Foley, M, (2009), A Mixed Public-Private System for 2020. A paper commissioned by the Australian Health 
and Hospitals Reform Commission. Available at: 
www.health.gov.au/internet/nhhrc/publishing.nsf/Content/16F7A93D8F578DB4CA2574D7001830E9/$File/A 
Mixed Public-Private System for 2020 (M Foley).pdf   
8
 Naylor C and Gregory S (2009). Briefing: Independent Sector Treatment Centres, King’s Fund. 
http://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/files/kf/field/field_publication_file/briefing-independent-sector-
treatment-centres-istc-chris-naylor-sarah-gregory-kings-fund-october-2009.pdf 
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In the past, however, there have been numerous examples of short term contracting 
between public and private hospitals, mainly designed to relieve pressures on the public 
hospitals. Most appear to have been local arrangements. In the 1980s public health services 
in the New South Wales (NSW) Illawarra region were regularly contracting with private 
hospitals for urological services (these arrangements remain in place today).9 At a national 
level, in the early 1990s around 16,000 public patients across Australia received treatment 
in private hospitals under contract from public hospitals. By 1996-97 this had risen to 
40,000.10 
 
Approaches to contracting in the states 
 
Contracting, then, is not a new phenomenon in Australia and has been undertaken across all 
jurisdictions in one form or another for many years. Generally it has been undertaken on an 
ad-hoc and short term basis to address lengthening waiting lists in particular specialties in a 
local area or, occasionally, in a more general state-wide program such as occurred in NSW in 
2005. In NSW in 2006, 1020 public surgical patients were treated privately at public 
expense.11 
 
Health service managers’ experiences with contracting – both positive and negative – have 
helped determine whether contracting arrangements continue on a more regular basis or 
remain as small-scale, one-off initiatives. 
 
A number of jurisdictions have in more recent times moved to formalise contracting 
arrangements. The approaches range from relatively hands-off arrangements, like those in 
New South Wales, where local health districts can determine whether or not they utilise 
contracting (provided they abide by a set of procurement principles) to much more 
formalised and structured approaches such those adopted in Queensland and Victoria. 
 
Queensland’s Surgery Connect program has been running since 2007 and uses a brokerage 
system to source private providers wishing to participate in the scheme. If a patient has 
waited longer than clinically recommended for elective surgery, and the demand for this 
service can’t be met in a public hospital, the patient may be offered an opportunity to be 
treated in a private hospital through the Surgery Connect initiative. 
 
Depending on the specialty area, the patient is either referred to a private hospital, which is 
responsible for co-ordinating and paying for all aspects of the patient’s treatment, or is 
referred to a treating practitioner who then co-ordinates (but does not pay for) the hospital 
accommodation and other services. The Surgery Connect scheme treated 1085 patients in 
the six months to December 2013. 
 
                                                          
9
 National Health Strategy (1991) Issues Paper no. 2, Hospital Services in Australia: Access and Funding. 
10
 Productivity Commission (1999). Private Hospitals in Australia. Canberra. 
11
 Garling Report (2008). Final Report of the Special Commission of Inquiry Acute Care Services in NSW Public 
Hospitals. 
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In addition to the state-wide Surgery Connect scheme, local health districts in Queensland 
are also able to contract directly with private hospitals in their regions. 
 
Victoria’s Competitive Elective Surgery Initiative has allocated up to $165 million for 
contracts for elective surgery for public patients over the period 2013-14 to 2016-17. This 
includes $15 million which has been allocated to 17 public and public and private hospital 
partnerships in 2013-14 to undertake 2,235 operations (around 200 more than would have 
been undertaken under standard Victorian government funding arrangements). The 
Victorian Department of Health funds this initiative through a competitive tendering process 
which is open to both public and private hospitals. 
 
Health reform agreements and incentives to consider contracting 
 
In recent years, the Commonwealth, state and territory (the states) governments have 
embarked on a series of health reforms, many of them centring on the financing and 
performance of public hospitals. Three in particular provide the states with some incentives 
to consider expanding the use of contracting, namely the introduction of National Elective 
Surgery Targets; activity-based funding for public hospitals; and a national efficient price for 
inpatient (and some outpatient) treatments. 
 
(a) National Elective Surgery Targets 
 
At a national level, the states have committed to reducing long waiting times for elective 
surgery as a component of broader health reform (see the National Partnership Agreement 
on Improving Public Hospital Services, July 2011 and the National Health Reform 
Agreement, August 2011). 
 
The National Partnership Agreement on Improving Public Hospital Services comprises a 
National Elective Surgery Target (NEST) with the following aims: 
 
 to increase the proportion of people seen within the clinically recommended time; 
 to reduce the average time waited beyond the clinically recommended time; and 
 to ensure that the 10 per cent of people who have waited the longest beyond the 
clinically recommended time are actually seen within the reporting year.  
 
While each state starts from a different baseline, the targets progressively tighten each year 
so that by 2016 all are committed to ensuring that 100 per cent of patients are seen within 
the clinically recommended times. 
 
To help them achieve elective surgery targets, the Commonwealth has provided both 
facilitation and reward funding. Over the next three years of the Partnership Agreement 
(2014-16), the Commonwealth will provide the states with reward funding of up to $24.7m 
in each year (spread across all jurisdictions) if they reach their targets. 
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The COAG Reform Council, the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare and the National 
Health Performance Authority all report regularly on the progress of each jurisdiction 
towards achieving their targets. These comparative reports attract considerable media 
attention when they are released and provide a strong incentive for jurisdictions to meet 
their targets. 
 
(b) Commonwealth Activity Based Funding 
 
One of the key components of health reform in recent years has been a change to the 
funding mechanism by which the Commonwealth contributes its proportion of public 
hospital funding to the states. The new mechanism of activity based funding (ABF) provides 
a Commonwealth contribution for each unit of activity undertaken by public hospitals. This 
is currently around 40 per cent of the ‘efficient price’ which is determined on an annual 
basis by the Independent Hospital Pricing Authority. 
 
The previous funding mechanism utilised ‘block funding’, which essentially provided a fixed 
global Commonwealth payment for an expected volume of public hospital activity. 
 
The introduction of ABF funding by the Commonwealth, which does not have a volume cap, 
may provide an additional incentive to undertake contracting. For example, if public hospital 
demand is greater than anticipated, the cost of undertaking additional work either in-house 
or by contracting it out will now, in part, is compensated by a Commonwealth ABF payment. 
Previously, unanticipated additional activity would have been funded solely by the states – 
whose response was often to try to reduce access to elective surgery during the particular 
payment period – leading to longer waiting times. 
 
(c) A national efficient price for hospitals 
 
The price set by the Commonwealth for each public hospital inpatient procedure may also 
have an impact on the attractiveness of contracting. Where a public hospital can undertake 
a particular procedure at a relatively low cost, it may be to its financial advantage to 
specialise in that procedure and contract out other relatively higher cost procedures to 
another provider (particularly if it can be sourced for a lower price). 
 
The extent to which individual hospitals and hospital networks pursue this strategy, or 
indeed undertake additional contracting beyond public sector hospitals will, however, be 
primarily determined by the service level agreements that they have with their state health 
departments. Under the health reform agreements the states remain both system managers 
and the majority funders of public hospitals.  
 
Importantly, the COAG health reform agreements recognise that private and not-for-profit 
hospitals may be contracted to provide public hospital services and such work will attract an 
ABF payment. 
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Lessons from practice 
 
General comments 
 
In discussions with the interviewees, there was general agreement about the problems that 
made it difficult for short-term contracting to work well for patients and health services. 
Surprisingly, there was also broad agreement about some of the solutions to these 
problems. This is good news for policymakers as it provides them with some clear lessons to 
guide policy development. 
 
The interviews reveal, however, that short-term contracting of inpatient care remains highly 
controversial. Even when addressing the highest level questions, interviewees had widely 
divergent views – should, for example, governments be encouraging contracting between 
public and private hospitals at all? 
 
It is not surprising that people working in the public and private sectors had different views. 
What was surprising was that views differed even within sectors. Interviewees also had very 
different views about how and when contracting should be carried out, and for which type 
of patients it should be considered. 
 
These points of contention can be helpful for policymakers working in this area as they 
highlight the key areas where there are perceived to be problems. While some 
controversies are always likely to remain, many of the problems could be remedied if given 
some serious consideration by policymakers. 
 
One of the most important findings from this study is that nearly all interviewees, regardless 
of sector, expressed a desire for policymakers to do some serious thinking about the relative 
roles of the public and private sectors in health care. This is the broader structural issue that 
underpins contracting arrangements in the hospital sector. 
 
Lesson 1: Avoid ad hoc approaches to contracting 
 
One of the most common complaints hospital executives made about contracting is that too 
often it is done in an ad hoc way. They complained that state governments often made the 
decision to contract public patient care to the private sector late in the financial year (or 
immediately before an election), and there was an expectation that the private sector 
would be easily able to accommodate these requests. 
 
Private hospital executives highlighted several reasons why they found this ad hoc approach 
frustrating and an obstacle to developing more productive collaboration between the public 
and private hospital sectors. A common complaint was that the public sector usually gave 
very little notice that contract work would soon become available. Hospital executives 
reported, for example, that although patients had been waiting a long time for surgery 
(years sometimes), they were only released for surgery under contracting arrangement in 
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bulk lots, and when budgets allowed. For private hospitals, this meant that often they were 
asked to treat hundreds of elective surgery patients within very short periods of time, and 
sometimes this was impossible because the hospital was already operating at close to full 
capacity. 
 
Several interviewees said that this problem was particularly frustrating because it was 
entirely avoidable. They explained that governments have sophisticated ways of collecting 
and monitoring waiting list data and know well in advance the precise number and type of 
patients who have been waiting longer for treatment than clinically recommended. They 
argued that, armed with this detailed waiting list data, there were no convincing reasons 
(beyond political ones) that the private hospitals should be given such short timeframes to 
undertake public sector contract work. 
 
Private hospital executives also complained that requests to do public contract work often 
came at times of the year when medical specialists were unavailable – for example, during 
school holidays or when major international conferences were on. Knowing that the 
availability of key medical specialists would be limited during these periods, this problem 
was also seen as entirely avoidable. 
 
Some private hospital executives also pointed out that fluctuation in private hospital 
capacity was relatively predictable – that is, there were certain times of the year where they 
were very likely to have spare capacity. Executives from both sectors explained that it would 
be much easier to make contracting work if decisions about patient numbers, types and 
timeframes were planned well in advance. 
 
Criticisms of the ad hoc nature of much of the contracting in the hospital sector were not 
confined to private hospitals. Some of the bureaucrats and public hospital executives 
interviewed were also very critical of ad hoc contracting arrangements because they often 
resulted in governments paying private hospitals a premium to treat public patients. This 
was partly because private hospitals had to pay theatre staff overtime so they could treat 
the extra patients, and they had to pay surgeons and anaesthetists a premium to do extra 
work. Often in negotiations over medical specialist’s fees, private hospitals say they have 
little choice but to pay higher fees to these specialists, because without their willing 
cooperation the work would not be undertaken. This situation is particularly pronounced in 
medical specialties where there are workforce shortages. 
 
One interviewee voiced strong objections to paying private hospitals a premium to do public 
sector work. She argued that much of the work is considered to be relatively low risk (and 
therefore profitable) and the public sector could easily do it (and often for less) if they were 
allowed the opportunity to bid for the extra funding. Once again, she pointed to the ad hoc 
approach as the problem, explaining that the public sector is capable of expanding its 
capacity to treat the public patients waiting too long for care if they were given enough time 
to plan for it and greater assurances about the extra patient volumes. 
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Additionally, the ad hoc approach to contracting places a high administrative burden on 
staff. When a private hospital agrees to do public contract work, staff have to reorganise 
theatre schedules and staffing rosters in order to accommodate the extra patients. Hospital 
executives and finance managers also have to negotiate contracts for service delivery in a 
very short timeframe. Because this work is often complex, detailed and fairly specialised, 
and done in addition to routine business, it can take a toll on staff. 
 
Despite all the challenges with ad hoc contracting, most (although not all) of the hospital 
executives interviewed accepted that it was probably part and parcel of working in the 
hospital sector. They recognised that demand for hospital care sometimes increased 
suddenly and unexpectedly – for example, when there was a particularly nasty flu season. 
 
Because hospitals cannot do much to increase capacity in the very short-term, many public 
hospital executives accepted that they sometimes needed to look to the private sector to 
meet demand. They pointed out, however, that when these short-term solutions were 
required, it was generally much easier to arrange if the public and private hospitals were 
already accustomed to working cooperatively together and had established relationships – 
for example, because they had longer-term public-private partnerships of some sort 
operating. 
 
Some interviewees explained that one of the challenges with short-term, ad hoc 
collaborations was that the public sector only tended to do it when it was desperate (for 
example, when they were at risk of not meeting emergency department or elective surgery 
targets). Under these circumstances, it was difficult to develop relationships of trust and 
identify mutual benefits to the arrangements. Instead, the benefits were seen to be one-
sided, favouring the private sector. 
 
Lesson 2: Don't assume that the private sector is willing to do public sector contracting 
work 
 
For short-term contracting to be viable, private hospitals must be willing to treat public 
patients, but the private sectors’ enthusiasm for public contracting cannot be assumed. As 
one private hospital executive stated: ‘we spend a lot of money on increasing the size of 
[private hospitals] so…we certainly wouldn’t want to interrupt our normal business flow by 
effectively doing a favour for the public hospital system’. 
 
Several private hospital interviewees pointed out that they currently did very little short 
term contract work, and had no desire to do more of it. One of the main reasons for this 
was that there was a perception that it undermined the value of private health insurance. As 
one private hospital executive explained, there were various business and administrative 
reasons why his hospital did not do contracting work, but the threat public contract work 
posed to the value of private health insurance was the main reason they steered clear of it.  
 
 12    
Most of the private hospital executives, however, were not outright opponents of 
contracting. Instead, their support for it hinged on how extensively it was done. As one 
executive explained, timely access to care is one of the key ways private hospitals 
distinguish themselves from public ones. If contracting expands to such an extent that it 
radically reduces or abolishes waiting times in public hospitals, private hospitals would no 
longer have an advantage, and the value of private health insurance would be diminished. 
 
Another private hospital executive concurred with this view. He said that while his hospital 
group did very little short-term contracting, the real problem arose when contracting 
became routine practice. This caused people with private health insurance to question why 
they had bought it as other people could get into the private hospital without it. 
 
Views among private hospital executives on how short-term contracting affected the value 
of private insurance were not uniform. Several said that there was a perception, particularly 
among private hospital staff, that public contract work undermined private health 
insurance. However several others said that opposition to contracting dropped off once 
they reminded staff that patients were treated equally regardless of who paid the bill, and 
that contracting helped keep surgeons happy and brought in additional revenue. 
 
Some private hospital executives suggested that their views on contracting were a moot 
point because they rarely had spare capacity (either surgical theatres or hospital beds). They 
explained that they had carefully developed business plans that ensured they were 
operating at near full capacity most of the time. This meant that the massive capital 
investments made in building and operating their hospitals delivered profits. Some indicated 
that they would be willing to increase capacity to treat more public contract patients, but to 
justify the capital investment and business risk, they would need much more secure 
contracts from the public sector, with guarantees on patient volumes and price, and over 
longer periods of time. 
 
While some private hospital executives were open to considering contracting under the 
right circumstances, some others remained sceptical about its merits even if it was done in 
more strategic manner over the long term. One interviewee said that relying on public 
contract work as part of the business model always involved a relatively high degree of risk 
because governments can make changes that quickly undermine the arrangements. 
 
He explained that he had learnt this the hard way. His private hospital had invested in some 
expensive technology that was not available in the local public hospital on the 
understanding that they would treat public patients under contract. They arrangements 
worked well over several years but came to a grinding halt when the public hospital 
eventually decided to invest in the same piece of technology. As soon as it did, the market 
they had established for providing this type of care evaporated, leaving them with the 
expensive technology but much less capacity to generate revenue from it. The lesson he 
learnt from this was that contract work should be treated as a bonus, an optional extra, 
rather than something that private hospitals could rely on as part of the business plan. 
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A public hospital executive (who had previously worked in the private sector) identified 
another reason why the private sector was sometimes unenthusiastic about short-term 
contracting work. She had once tried to negotiate an arrangement with a local private 
hospital to undertake some contract work while they were redeveloping the public hospital, 
but they were not interested in doing the work because ‘they weren’t keen on the type of 
patients’ – for example, medical and sub-acute care patients. They were interested in 
admitting the private patients, even if they were medical or sub-acute patients, but not the 
public ones. The only exception they were prepared to entertain was admitting surgical 
patients under public contract arrangements. 
 
Lesson 3: Contracting tends to work better in regional areas 
 
One of the clearest findings in this project was that contracting tends to work better in 
regional areas than urban areas; in regional areas, contracting is seen as being mutually 
beneficial to public and private hospitals. 
 
One public hospital executive who had managed hospitals in both regional and urban areas 
said the differences were stark in his mind. He explained that contracting worked much 
better in regional areas because there was more certainty about the nature and volume of 
work over a 12-month period, which meant hospitals could develop a secure business 
model. He went on to explain that: 
 
‘the boundaries between public and private are blurred in the bush, and this is a good thing. The public 
and private hospitals are mutually dependent on one another, so there is an imperative to 
cooperate…there is also a stronger imperative to survive’. 
 
Many hospital executives with experience of contracting in regional areas explained that it 
was successful because it helped both the public and private hospitals solve workforce 
problems. It is often very difficult to attract medical specialists to regional areas but when 
contracting arrangements were in place, it was easier to recruit them because of the ready-
made opportunities for work in both sectors. 
 
Relatively new specialists and overseas trained doctors often find the opportunities 
generated by contracting an attractive proposition. Several interviewees pointed out that in 
regional areas, public hospitals do not always have enough work to offer full-time jobs to 
less established medical specialists, while private hospitals are also unable to guarantee 
enough work to entice them. If there are regular opportunities for newer specialists to do 
public sector contract work, it means they are also able to take up employment in the public 
sector while also building up a part-time private practice. 
 
Unlike their city counterparts, these medical specialists don’t have to spend years building 
up relationships and a referral base before establishing a private practice (and most do want 
to do some work in the private sector). These arrangements are mutually beneficial to 
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public and private hospitals, but patients also benefit because they would otherwise have 
had to travel to metropolitan areas for care. 
 
When asked why contracting tends to be easier in regional areas than cities, one regional 
private hospital executive was quick to highlight the key reasons. He explained that there is 
a lot of collaboration between public and private hospitals in regional areas out of sheer 
necessity. They routinely lend each other equipment, run joint training sessions and do 
short-term contracting because they have to – when there are only two hospitals in town, 
or the area, there is no one else to ask for help. Private hospitals in regional areas also tend 
to have lower occupancy rates, and this means there are greater financial incentives for 
them to enter into contracting arrangements with the local public hospital. 
 
While there are various practical and business reasons why contracting tends to work better 
in regional areas, several interviewees said that in the end, it came down to relationships. As 
two executives from a regional public hospital explained: ‘we get into argy-bargy every time 
we have to renegotiate the contract [with the private hospital]’ but ‘overall we've got a 
good relationship.’ 
 
They went on to give practical examples of how the local private hospital had helped them 
out – for example, by making beds available when the public hospital was full. Instead of 
allowing medical and sub-acute patients to take up beds in the surgical wards (thereby 
limiting the number of surgical patients who could be admitted), some public hospitals have 
asked their private hospital colleagues to admit them under contracting arrangement. 
 
In another region, public hospital executives explained how they had to make urgent 
arrangements to use surgical theatres in the private hospital because their units were closed 
down for a few days. They explained, ‘they [the local private hospital] allowed us to do 
emergency surgery…so in fact where we've had a crisis they've been able to support us.’ 
 
Even hospital executives who were relatively unenthusiastic about contracting conceded 
that long-term contracting arrangements were in place in some of the group’s regional 
hospitals, and were successful because the hospitals had more direct relationships with the 
community. 
 
Lesson 4: Clear and consistent pricing policies for contracted services are needed 
 
When weighing up whether or not to do contracting work, price is a critical consideration 
for many private sector executives. However from the interviews conducted in this project, 
it was clear that there is no consistent approach to pricing public sector contract work, and 
many different views on how price should be determined. 
 
Some interviewees argued that the price paid to the private sector for contracted work 
should consider factors such as urgency and volume – that is, private hospitals should be 
paid higher prices when they are expected to do the work in a short time frame, and lower 
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prices should be paid when high volumes of work are guaranteed over a longer timeframe. 
Others argued that a schedule of fees for public contract work should be developed at the 
state or local level and applied regardless of urgency or volume. 
 
Others advocated for a cost-based pricing method where hospital costs, such as surgeons’ 
fees, theatre costs, wages and overtime, are used to determine a reasonable price for 
contracted services. And some private hospital executives said that in reality, their views 
about what was an acceptable price for public contract work depended largely on the price 
they were paid by private health insurance funds for treating similar cases. It made no 
sense, for example, for them to admit public patients if they were paid less than what they 
would be paid by a private insurance fund. 
 
Hospital executives’ views on pricing appeared to be closely aligned with their views on the 
merits of contracting. Private sector hospitals that did contracting because they saw it as 
part of a broader cooperative and resource sharing relationship across the public and 
private sectors were more likely to prefer pricing policies that were relatively simple and 
imposed few additional administrative burdens on staff. However for some of the more 
business-minded executives, especially in states where contracting was routinely done, the 
price paid was a major issue that strongly influenced their decisions. Executives from 
hospitals that only did contracting work if it made good business sense were more likely to 
have, or support, a rigorous cost-based approach to pricing. 
 
Two private hospital executives (from the same hospital group) explained that they had had 
very negative experiences when contracting with the state government because of the way 
pricing was done. In essence, they argued that the government was paying too much to the 
private sector for contracted patients, which ultimately undermined the program. 
 
They considered that the government made two mistakes when setting up contracting 
arrangements with the private sector. First, they set the price too high as they didn’t 
understand that contract work could be done in the private sector at marginal rates rather 
than at the full cost. They explained that public sector work was only ever seen as ‘cream on 
the top’, which meant that other overheads were covered through routine business. 
 
They believe its second mistake was that although the state department of health set 
standard rates for medical fees when doing contract work, it then negotiated separately 
with groups of medical specialists who were not happy with the rate (specialists’ rates were 
originally based on an existing schedule of fees, which had different rates for different 
specialist groups). Once one specialist group had successfully negotiated for higher fees, 
other specialist groups began to use similar tactics with equal success. Over time, the price 
the government paid to the private sector for doing public sector work became difficult to 
justify, and public patients were instead sent to other public hospitals for treatment, with 
the private sector missing out altogether. 
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While pricing policies may appear at first to be an administrative matter, the experiences of 
those who have done public sector contract work reveal that it is a highly contentions area 
and pivotal to the success or failure of contracting arrangements. Because private hospital 
executives have divergent views on what is a fair price for public sector work, it is difficult 
for policymakers to use this as a guide for how to approach pricing. Perhaps the most useful 
approach would be for policymakers to first clarify the objective of contracting to the 
private sector – is it to speed up access to care for public patients, deliver efficiencies, 
maintain a viable private sector, or something else entirely? – and then determine a pricing 
policy to meets its objectives. 
 
Lesson 5: Successful contracting involves finding the right balance between state and local 
level control 
 
State governments have embraced contracting with various degrees of enthusiasm. In some 
states, formal programs have been established – Queensland and Victoria for example. In 
others, governments have made the decision to put contracting arrangements in place 
between hospitals at the local level to solve local problems. 
 
There are examples of long-term, relatively formal arrangements between public and 
private hospitals in a local area where the private hospital provides certain types of 
speciality services because it is not economically viable to run them in the public hospital. In 
regional areas, these arrangements were often developed because expensive equipment 
and technology was required, and the private sector had already invested in it, or there 
were workforce shortages and the government had made the decision that it was too costly 
to pay for fly-in fly-out medical specialists, or fund locums to come to town. 
 
Interviewees indicated many examples of contracting at the local level where collaborative 
arrangements were put in place to solve local problems. In many cases, the problem was 
bed shortages (there was a need for overflow capacity on an ad hoc basis) or workforce 
shortages in some medical specialties (public patients were then treated by specialists 
working in the private sector). Often, these local level problems were solved simply by 
public and private sector hospital executives meeting and negotiating a mutually agreeable 
arrangement. Over time, some of these short-term arrangements have become more 
permanent ones – for example, for the provision of palliative care services in North 
Queensland, urology services in regional NSW and ophthalmology services in regional 
Tasmania. However, in other cases, the arrangements broke down over time as hospital 
executives encountered many of the problems outlined in this issue brief. 
 
When asked whether contracting was best organised at the state or local level, most 
interviewees said that the state government had an important role to play in setting the 
broad policy parameters. They believe that the state government should be responsible for 
developing a governance framework to ensure that health services are taking a relatively 
consistent approach, for example on pricing. The also said that the state government should 
play a major role in contract negotiation and monitoring. Several interviewees explained 
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that these skills are fairly specialised, making it unrealistic to expect hospital executives at 
the local level to be able to handle complex negotiations with private sector negotiators, 
most of whom work in central offices of large private or not-for-profit organisations. 
 
They also argued that state governments should take a leadership role in developing policies 
on contracting. Because public hospital budgets are determined largely by state 
governments, their decisions have a major impact on waiting times and whether or not 
patients need to be treated in the private sector. Only they can provide some certainty 
about the volume of work. Without greater certainty, many in the private sector see 
contracting as an unattractive proposition because they are at the behest of what happens 
in the public sector. 
 
One state government bureaucrat explained that they were aware that hospitals wanted 
more certainty about contracting, and that governments often paid a premium for contract 
work because they couldn’t provide it. However the political and budget cycles in 
government mean that they are unable to give certainty beyond a year. He anticipated that 
the planned introduction of three-year budgeting cycles would allow governments to enter 
into longer contracts with private hospitals in the future. 
 
Views about the role that the state governments should play in contracting were not 
uniform. Most interviewees recognised the key role governments have in setting policies on 
contracting however they stressed the importance of avoiding a one-size-fits-all approach. 
They say that the contract must be flexible enough to accommodate local factors, such as 
fluctuations in hospital capacity dependent on local workforce availability or private sector 
capital investment decisions. Some interviewees pointed out that the problem with having 
regional health authorities and state governments solely in charge was that they were ‘not 
across the detail’ of service delivery, so often they didn’t realise they had a problem at the 
local level. 
 
One interviewee argued against the idea of the state government taking a lead role in 
initiating contracts between public and private hospitals. Reflecting on her experiences in 
setting up contracting arrangements between co-located public and private hospitals in 
South Australia, she said that the arrangements worked well because executives from both 
sectors were deeply involved in setting them up. They had a detailed knowledge of the 
contract – what was in, what was out – and this meant there were very few disputes once it 
was up and running. The people involved in operationalising the contract were the same 
ones who had negotiated it, so there was a lot less game playing and politics once it was 
signed off. 
 
She did acknowledge, however, that there could be benefits in having the state government 
involved. She speculated that negotiating contracts centrally might offer some protection 
for working relationships at the local level particularly during negotiations when 
relationships between hospital executives were at greatest risk of going sour. 
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Consideration also had to be given to history – that is, to past and existing relationships 
between the public and private hospitals in an area. In some of the reported cases, 
hostilities between the two sectors had built up over time, making it very unlikely that 
centrally imposed contracting arrangements would succeed. 
 
Conversely, in some areas strong and cooperative relationships between the local public 
and private hospital had developed over time, making it difficult, or even impossible, to 
scale them back without huge disruptions to business models, working relationships and 
patient care. 
 
The most common benefit interviewees identified for contracting at the local level was that 
it helped develop strong, cooperative relationships between the public and private sectors 
and consequently, it was then much easier to resolve issues that arose once the contracting 
arrangements were in place. 
 
One interviewee explained that the process of shifting patients from the public to the 
private sector and back again had the potential to substantially disrupt the patient journey. 
She explained that it was only possible to do short-term, or ad hoc, contracting work if the 
two hospitals had forged strong, cooperative relationships over time. Other interviewees 
supported this argument, explaining that these longstanding relationships of trust meant 
that the two sectors were willing and able to cooperate when crisis arose, such as the forced 
closure of theatres or breakdown of essential equipment. 
 
While local relationships are important, some interviewees warned against relying too 
heavily on relationships between individuals because people could be very parochial and 
unduly influenced by local power dynamics. Relying too much on the strength of personal 
relationships also made the success of contracting arrangements vulnerable to changes in 
personnel. As some interviewees explained, they had seen well established contracting 
arrangements suddenly come to an end when the hospital chief executive (from the public 
or private sector) left the job. 
 
For policymakers, finding the right balance between state and local level control is no doubt 
challenging and will vary across jurisdictions; what works in Queensland, for example, is very 
unlikely to work just as well in Tasmania. The lesson is that a distinction needs to be made 
between governance and procurement issues (which were best dealt with at the state 
level), and operational issues, such as those concerning clinicians and providers (which were 
best dealt with locally). The balance between state and local responsibility is also likely to 
change over time as hospitals and policymakers become more experienced in dealing with 
the challenges that arise when responsibilities are devolved to local health districts. 
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Options for reforming current practices 
 
‘Contracting…in theory I don’t mind it, but how you do it is really important’. 
 
The key question federal and state health policymakers need to address is not whether 
hospitals should contract out, but rather how they should do it. As this Issues Brief 
highlights, there is much to learn from those senior hospital executives with experience in 
contracting. When asked, many of them had well thought through views on reform options 
that might improve the way we do contracting now, and make better use of the resources 
of both the public and private health sectors. Some of those options, and the reasons 
practitioners advocated them, are outlined below. 
 
Option 1: Establish contracts over longer periods 
 
One of the most commonly recommended reform options suggested by interviewees (and 
perhaps the simplest) was to make contracts between the public and private sectors over 
longer periods of time. Interviewees argued that this should be relatively easy to do. The 
public sector has good data on patient waiting times and usually knows well in advance how 
many patients are likely to exceed clinically recommended waiting times, thereby triggering 
the possibility that they would receive their care under contract arrangements with the 
private sector. 
 
The main obstacles to implementing this reform are bureaucratic and political, according to 
several interviewees. They argue that certain state health departments or area health 
authorities were not willing (or able) to do the planning needed to ensure that longer-term 
contracting arrangements could be put in place. One senior bureaucrat agreed with this 
view, pointing to budgetary processes as the main obstacle. He claimed that state 
governments’ ability to plan well in advance was limited because budgeting was done 
annually. He hoped that the planned introduction of three year budgeting cycles in his state 
would allow the government to make longer-term contracting arrangements, and that this 
would go a long way to addressing the complaints made by the private hospital sector. 
 
Option 2: Adopt the brokerage model 
 
Several private hospital executives from the same hospital group in Queensland were strong 
advocates of the brokerage model that had once been integral to the Surgery Connect 
program in that state. They explained that when Surgery Connect started, they won the 
contract for brokering public patients care to the private sector. For a set fee, they made all 
the arrangements for public patients to receive care in a private hospital, including travel 
and post-discharge follow-up. 
 
Over time pubic waiting lists were substantially reduced, but the brokerage model came 
under attack because of the cost to government of brokerage fees. The executives 
recognised the problem and tried to remedy it by suggesting to the state government that 
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brokerage fees be reduced when the volume of patients was high, thereby reducing the 
overall cost of the scheme. This suggestion, however, was not taken up. 
 
Instead, the state government decided to take responsibility for arranging care for public 
patients and shifted the brokering service to the Queensland health department. Another 
major change was that public patients who were waiting too long for care were no longer 
automatically contracted to receive care in the private sector. Health department officials 
also looked for treatment options in the public sector. 
 
The issue of who should be responsible for brokering care for public patients was hotly 
contested. The private hospital interviewees argued that they had provided a better service 
for patients and they could have done it at a lower cost if their suggested changes were 
adopted. They also claimed that under the new system, medical specialists have a perverse 
incentive to keep people on the public waiting list as it means they will eventually be 
released for treatment under Surgery Connect, and the doctor can then charge much higher 
fees to see the patient in the private sector. 
 
The health department officials who took over the brokering argued that the key advantage 
of the Surgery Connect program was that it could buy care from any hospital, public or 
private. With greater competition, there were potential benefits to the government on the 
price paid for care. They did admit, however, that there was a problem with some medical 
specialists gaming the waiting list system. 
 
Despite the disagreement on how to operate the brokering system, most hospital 
executives and bureaucrats in Queensland agreed that the Surgery Connect program had 
been very successful in reducing the number of public patients on the waiting list for 
surgery. 
 
Option 3: Co-locate and share hospital infrastructure 
 
Several interviewees who had worked in places where public and private hospitals were co-
located suggested that it facilitated successful contracting between the two sectors. One of 
the main advantages of co-location was that longer-term arrangements could be put in 
place where services were shared between the two hospitals rather than duplicated in each 
of them. 
 
In one such location, a private hospital provided palliative care, oncology and renal services 
for both public and private patients in the area. With these long-term service delivery 
arrangements in place, both the public and private hospital could make informed decisions 
about investment in expensive technology where the other hospital was able to provide 
services. Because the hospitals were co-located, there was minimal inconvenience for 
patients and hospital staff. 
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Two public hospital executives also spoke favourably about a model operating in their local 
area where infrastructure in one specialty area was shared between public and private 
sectors – it is likely that similar small-scale arrangements are in other places around 
Australia. They explained that local contracting arrangements were developed for the 
provision of cardiac services soon after the public hospital was redeveloped. Public hospital 
executives realised that the cardiac unit they had built was too large, but the co-located 
private hospital was running short of space. 
 
In response, a private company (owned by the public hospital cardiac specialists) 
established a private cardiac catheter laboratory alongside the public hospital cardiac ward. 
The private company leased the space from the public hospital, funded the establishment of 
the laboratory, and were subsequently contracted to provide a certain volume of services to 
the public hospital. The cardiac medical specialists worked in both the public and private 
sectors; they were employed as staff specialists in the public hospital under terms and 
conditions that allowed them to also work as visiting medical officers. 
 
Hospital executives who had been involved in co-location and infrastructure sharing 
arrangements were positive about them, suggesting that they worked well because there 
was genuine benefit to both the public and private hospitals. One of the reasons they said it 
worked so well was that medical specialists work across both sectors. This means that when 
public patients are treated in the unit, the public hospital does not have to pay for medical 
fees, as the specialists are treating the patients in their public capacity. The overall price for 
care, therefore, is lower than it would be if the public patient was contracted to receive care 
in the private sector (where medical fees are charged). 
 
Another advantage was the quality of the relationships, with flexibility and trust being 
paramount. As one executive explained, the arrangements in his hospital had lasted for 
more than 20 years because ‘there is a disproportionate amount of trust’ between parties, 
made possible because medical specialists were able to move freely between the public and 
private sectors. He also highlighted that the co-location model was good for patient care. 
Because the two units were so closely integrated, it was easy to transfer them from the 
private unit to the public one if anything went wrong with their procedure, thereby reducing 
the risk of adverse events. 
 
The only potential downside identified to these arrangements was the perception that it 
was all too ‘in-house’, with contracts handed to the private sector owners and operators 
without considering alternatives that might be better. One interviewee pointed out that the 
providers had to tender for the business, and had won it because they offered the best 
price. 
 
Option 4: Establish contestable funding pools 
 
When asked about potential ways of making short-term contracting work better, several 
interviewees suggested that contestable funding pools should be set up. Under this 
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arrangement public and private hospitals would be in competition to treat public patients 
who had been too long on the list waiting for elective surgery. The Victorian government 
has already adopted this model; in 2012-13 it made $44 million available as part of the 
Competitive Elective Surgery Initiative, and in 2013-14, it increased the funding pool to 
$420.7 million over four years. 
 
Interviewees had various reasons for supporting this model, including: 
 
 it gives the public sector a chance to do some contracted elective surgery, which 
tends to be fairly routine and therefore margins are relative easy to make; 
 doing more contract work in the public sector means better continuity of care for 
patients; 
 the government ends up paying less to treat patients; and 
 it means that each sector is doing what it does best – the public sector doing more 
complex work (such as burns and transplants) and the private sector doing more 
routine elective surgery. 
 
One public hospital executive, while supportive of the model, warned that the public sector 
would need time to adjust if it was to successfully compete with the private sector for 
elective surgery work. He explained that while public hospitals wanted to treat the people 
on the waiting list for elective surgery, they couldn’t do it because they didn’t have the 
theatre or bed capacity. He went on to say that to be able to compete with the private 
sector for this work, the public hospitals would need to have access to more infrastructure 
funding. Without it, they would ‘just get slaughtered’. 
 
Option 5: Establish more public-private partnerships 
 
A number of interviewees spoke about their experiences with public-private partnerships 
(PPPs). One public hospital executive that had extensive experience with PPPs highlighted 
some successes and challenges with the model. He explained that in some locations, they 
had worked well because they provided certainty and security and allowed hospital 
administrators to plan over longer periods of time. For public hospitals they also facilitate 
the recruitment of more and better quality staff for whom working in a private hospital is an 
attraction. One private hospital executive also argued that sharing expensive infrastructure 
(for example, theatres and delivery suites) leads to efficiencies for both the public and 
private sectors. 
 
Some of the downsides to PPPs were also highlighted. In one case, a private hospital was 
returned to the public sector after five or six years where the arrangement was expected to 
last 20 years. The main reason the partnership failed was that the private hospital (which 
was in a regional area) did not do enough to grow its private capacity in the first few years. 
Instead, it had become reliant on the public sector work and after several years, the private 
operators determined that the business model was not sustainable. 
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Another private hospital executive emphasised the importance of the political climate to the 
success of PPPs. When reflecting on the experience of the Port Macquarie hospital 
experience with PPPs, he argued that the hospital was very successful both clinically and 
financially. Recruiting staff to the hospital was also easy. The problem, however, was the 
politics surrounding it; when the Coalition state government lost power and Labor was 
elected, the arrangement began to unravel because, he said, Labor was opposed to any 
form of privatisation. 
 
Many of the other challenges with PPPs identified by interviewees were the same as those 
identified with short-term contracting. For example: it was important for executives to 
develop skills and experience in negotiating contracts; arrangements worked better when 
there was genuine collaboration and real relationships, rather than just contractual 
relationships; and relying too much on key personnel posed a risk when personnel changed. 
However, as one public hospital executive explained, ‘we need to continue to think our way 
through [PPPs]…but given the health system’s expertise applied over the last six to seven 
years, I’m optimistic’. 
 
Option 6: Separate the purchaser and the provider 
 
This final reform option advocated by some interviewees is the boldest: the introduction of 
Medicare Select, a competitive insurance model outlined by the National Health and 
Hospitals Reform Commission in 2009. 
 
One of the core features of the model is the formal separation of the funder and provider 
roles in health care, giving patients more choice about receiving treatment in the public or 
private sectors. The supporting arguments are that it would allow the public and private 
sectors to compete on an equal footing; it would be the most efficient use of resources in 
the sector; and patients would have the right to choose both the doctor and the system for 
their treatment. 
 
While interviewees recognised that this option was a major reform, some were convinced 
that it was possible for the government to introduce such a change over time. 
 
Conclusion  
 
Australia is facing major changes to the way we fund health care. The pressures on 
sustainable funding are most intense in the hospital system. Public hospitals are the largest 
single area of health expenditure in Australia; they accounted for almost a third of all 
recurrent expenditure in 2011-12. The state and territory governments contributed about 
53 per cent of total recurrent funding for public hospitals in 2011-12, and the 
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Commonwealth Government about 38 per cent. Both levels of government have good 
reasons to scrutinise spending on public hospitals.12 
 
Contracting with private hospitals has the potential to contain public sector costs, but this 
potential can only be realised if private hospitals deliver care for public patients at lower 
costs than public hospitals. This paper does not provide ‘hard data’ on the costs of public 
contracting, so it is not able to determine whether or not there any financial benefits. 
Because there is no publicly available, robust and comparable national data on the costs of 
treating public patients in public and private hospitals, it is not yet possible to explore this 
issue in any detail. 
 
The Productivity Commission encountered similar problems with robust comparable data on 
public and private hospital costs when it examined the performance of the two sectors in 
2009.13 Since then, some work has been done to improve hospital data collection and 
reporting – for example, by the Independent Hospital Pricing Authority, the Department of 
Health, and the Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council’s National Health Information 
Standards and Statistics Committee. This work needs to be advanced so that it can be used 
by to inform policymaking in this area. 
 
Policymakers can make some changes that will improve contracting arrangements in 
Australia, even in the absence of robust financial data. Some relatively small-scale reforms 
options suggested by hospital executives are outlined in this paper – for example, 
establishing contracting arrangements that run over longer periods, and setting up brokers 
who can help find hospitals (public or private) that are able to do elective surgery work 
when it is needed. These reforms would take away the rationale private hospitals have for 
charging a premium when treating public patients, and would create financial incentives for 
governments to scale-up hospital contracting. 
 
Larger-scale reforms are likely to be controversial as contracting touches on many vexed 
and unresolved issues in our mixed health system. These range from using government 
funds to pay for care in to private hospitals, allowing public hospitals to admit (and charge) 
private patients, and the role of private insurance in the context of Medicare. Policymakers 
will have to tackle these contentious issues if they want to continue to use the resources of 
the private sector to solve access issues for public patients. 
 
 
  
                                                          
12 Australian Government, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), Health expenditure Australia 
2011–12, Health and welfare expenditure series no. 50. Cat. no. HWE 59, 2013, Canberra. 
13
 Australian Government, Productivity Commission 2009, Public and Private Hospitals, Research Report, 
Canberra. 
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Data and methodological approach 
 
The analysis in this paper comes from qualitative interviews with 24 interviewees, all of 
them with substantial practical experience with public sector contracting. A full list of de-
identified interviewees is provided below. Interviewees were senior executives (chief 
executives and other executive team members) from public, public-private and not-for-
profit hospitals, and some senior state-level bureaucrats. 
 
Interviewees were recruited through the researchers’ networks, so it was a convenience 
sample. Because funding for this project was limited, it was not possible to ensure that 
interviewees were representative of hospital executives overall. Interviewees from all three 
hospital sectors, however, were recruited and participated in the research. As a collective, 
they had experience with hospital contracting in every state and territory of Australia, 
except the Northern Territory. Some interviewees worked for national organisations, so 
they were able to speak about contracting in multiple jurisdictions. Some had worked in 
different jurisdictions and different sectors throughout their career, so they were able to 
speak about these various experiences during interviews. 
 
All interviews were conducted by one member of the research team between May 2012 and 
January 2013. Most interviews were conducted face-to-face, with a few conducted over the 
telephone. On average, interviews lasted between 45 mins to one hour. 
 
All interviewees gave their express consent to have interviews recorded digitally, and were 
given the opportunity to review the draft paper and make any corrections to comments 
attributed to them. Subsequently, any references to specific interviewees were removed 
because once information on interviewees’ state, sector and position was listed (see list 
below), it was possible to individuals, even though data was de-identified. 
 
Interview voice recording were stored digitally on a password protected computer. Only the 
researcher who conducted the interviews had access to the data. 
 
All interviews were transcribed and a thematic analysis was conducted. The key organising 
framework for analysing data was around ascertaining interviewees: 
 
 views and experiences of contracting, 
 perceived barriers to contracting, and 
 potential reforms that could improve contracting. 
 
Interviewees were also asked about their views on the impact of recent national health 
reforms (for example, activity-based funding) but very few had thought in depth about the 
implications for contracting, so this data was not used in the paper. 
 
  
 26    
List of de-identified 
interviewees 
 
Interview 1  
 Executive, not-for-profit public and private hospitals  
 National organisation  
Interview 2  
 Executive, for-profit private hospital group  
 National organisation  
Interview 3  
 Executive, public hospital 
 NSW 
Interview 4  
 Executive, not-for-profit private hospital/s  
 Queensland 
Interview 5  
 Executive, not-for-profit public hospital 
 NSW 
Interview 6  
 Executive, not-for-profit private hospital  
 Queensland 
Interview 7  
 Bureaucrat 
 SA 
Interview 8  
 Executive, public and not-for-profit hospitals 
 Queensland 
Interview 9  
 Bureaucrat 
 Queensland 
Interview 10  
 Executive, public hospital 
 Queensland 
Interview 11  
 Executive, public hospital 
 Tasmania 
Interview 12  
 Executive, public hospital (also experience in private hospital) 
 SA 
Interview 13  
 Executive, not-for-profit private hospitals 
 WA  
Interview 14  
 Executive, public hospital  
 NSW 
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Interview 15  
 Executive, not-for-profit private hospital 
 Victoria  
Interview 16  
 Executive, not-for-profit private hospitals 
 Victoria   
Interview 17  
 Bureaucrat  
 Tasmania  
Interview 18  
 Executive, public hospital 
 Tasmania  
Interview 19  
 Executive, public hospital 
 NSW 
Interview 20  
 Bureaucrat 
 Queensland 
Interview 21  
 Executive, public and not-for-profit private hospitals 
 National organisation  
Interview 22  
 Executive, public hospital 
 NSW 
Interview 23  
 Executive, not-for-profit private hospitals  
 Queensland 
Interview 24  
 Executive, public hospital 
 NSW 
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